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Spinoza's Ethics2025|PDF|Epub|mobi|kindle电子书版本百度云盘下载
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- Spinoza 著
- 出版社: J.M.Dent & Sons Ltd.
- ISBN:
- 出版时间:1959
- 标注页数:267页
- 文件大小:88MB
- 文件页数:314页
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图书目录
PART Ⅰ CONCERNING GOD1
DEFINITIONS1
Ⅰ.Cause of Itself (causa sui)1
Ⅱ.Finite in its Kind (in suo genere finita)1
Ⅲ.Substance (substantia)1
Ⅳ.Attribute (attributum)1
Ⅴ.Mode (modus)1
Ⅵ.God (Deus)1
Ⅶ.The thing is said to be Free (libera),Necessary (necessaria),or Compelled (coacta)2
Ⅷ.Eternity (oeternitas)2
AXIOMS Ⅰ.-Ⅶ2
PROPOSITIONS3
Ⅰ.A substance is prior in its nature to Its modifications3
Ⅱ.Two substances,having different attributes,have nothing in common between them3
Ⅲ.Of two things having nothing in common between them,one cannot be the cause of the other3
Ⅳ.Two or three distinct things are distinguished one from the other either by the difference of the attributes of the substances or by the difference of their modifications3
Ⅴ.In the nature of things,two or more things may not be granted having the same nature or attribute3
Ⅵ.One substance cannot be produced by another Corollary4
Ⅶ.Existence appertains to the nature of substance4
Ⅷ.All substance is necessarily infinite4
Notes5
Ⅸ.The more reality or being a thing has,the more attributes will it have7
Ⅹ.Each attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself7
Note7
Ⅺ.God or a substance consisting of infinite attributes,each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence,necessarily exists7
Note9
Ⅻ.No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived,from which it would follow that substance can be divided into parts10
ⅩⅢ.Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible Corollary10
Note10
ⅩⅣ.Except God no substance can be granted or conceived Corollaries11
ⅩⅤ.Whatever is,is in God,and nothing can exist or be conceived without God11
Note11
ⅩⅥ.Infinite things in infinite modes (that is,all things which can fall under the heading of infinite intellect) must necessarily follow from the necessity of divine nature15
Corollaries15
ⅩⅦ.God acts merely according to his own laws,and is compelled by no one15
Corollaries15
Note16
ⅩⅧ.God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things18
ⅩⅨ.God and all the attributes of God are eternal18
Note18
ⅩⅩ.God's existence and his essence are one and the same thing19
Corollaries19
ⅩⅪ.All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must exist for ever and infinitely,or must exist eternally and infinitely through that same attribute19
ⅩⅫ.Whatever follows from an attribute of God,in so far as it is modified by such a modification as exists of necessity and infinitely through the same,must also exist of necessity and infinitely20
ⅩⅩⅢ.Every mode which of necessity and infinitely exists must of necessity have followed either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God,or from some attribute modified by a modification which exists of necessity and infinitely20
ⅩⅩⅣ.The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence21
Corollary21
ⅩⅩⅤ.God is not only the effecting cause of the existence of things,but also of their essence21
Note21
Corollary21
ⅩⅩⅥ.A thing which is determined for the performing of anything was so determined necessarily by God,and a thing which is not determined by God cannot deter mine of itself to do anything21
ⅩⅩⅦ.A thing which is determined by God for the per forming of anything cannot render itself undetermined22
ⅩⅩⅧ.Every individual thing,or whatever thing that is finite and has a determined existence,cannot exist nor be determined for action unles it is determined for action and existence by another cause which is also finite and has a determined existence;and again,this cause also cannot exist nor be determined for action unless it be determined for existence and action by another cause which also is finite and has a determined existence:and so on to infinity22
Note23
ⅩⅩⅨ.In the nature of things nothing contingent (contingens) is granted,but all things are determined by the necessity of divine nature for existing and working in a certain way23
Note24
ⅩⅩⅩ.Intellect,finite or infinite in actuality (actus),must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God and nothing else24
ⅩⅩⅪ.The intellect in action,whether it be finite or infinite,as will,desire,love,etc.,must be referred not to active but passive nature24
Note25
ⅩⅩⅫ.Will can only be called a necessary cause,not a free one25
Corollaries25
ⅩⅩⅩⅢ.Things could not have been produced by God in any other manner or order than that in which they were produced26
Notes26
ⅩⅩⅩⅣ.The power of God is the same as his essence29
ⅩⅩⅩⅤ.Whatever we conceive to be in the power of God necessarily exists29
ⅩⅩⅩⅥ.Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow29
APPENDIX30
PART Ⅱ CONCERNING THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND37
PREFACE37
DEFINITIONS37
Ⅰ.Body (corpus)37
Ⅱ.That which appertains to the essence of a thing37
Ⅲ.Idea (idea)37
Ⅳ.Adequate Idea (idea adcequata)37
Ⅴ.Duration (duratio)38
Ⅵ.Reality and Perfection (realitas et perfedio)38
Ⅶ.Individual Things (res singulares)38
AXIOMS Ⅰ.-Ⅴ.38
PROPOSITIONS38
Ⅰ.Thought (cogitatio) is an attribute of God,or God is a thinking thing38
Note39
Ⅱ.Extension (extensio) is an attribute of God,or God is an extended thing39
Ⅲ.In God there is granted not only the idea of his essence,but also the idea of all the things which follow necessarily from his essence39
Note39
Ⅳ.The idea of God from which infinite things in infinite modes follow can only be one40
Ⅴ.The formal being of ideas acknowledges God as its cause only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing,and not in so far as he is revealed in some other attribute:that is,the ideas,not only of the attributes of God,but also of individual things,do not acknowledge their ideals or the objects perceived as their effecting cause,but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing40
Ⅵ.The modes of any attribute of God have God for their cause only in so far as he is considered through that attribute,and not in so far as he is considered through any other attribute41
Corollary41
Ⅶ.The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things41
Corollary41
Note41
Ⅷ.The ideas of individual things or modes which do not exist must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God in the same way as the formal essences of individual things or modes are contained in the attributes of God42
Corollary42
Note43
Ⅸ.The idea of an individual thing actually existing has God for its cause,not in so far as he is infinite,but in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of another individual thing actually existing of which also God is the cause,in so far as he is affected by another third idea,and so on to infinity43
Corollary44
Ⅹ.The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man,or,again,substance does not constitute the form (forma) of man44
Notes44
Corollary44
Ⅺ.The first part which constitutes the actual being of the human mind is nothing else than the idea of an individual thing actually existing45
Corollary46
Note46
Ⅻ.Whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind must be perceived by the human mind,or the idea of that thing must necessarily be found in the human mind:that is,if the object of the idea constituting the human mind be the body,nothing can happen in that body which is not perceived by the mind46
Note47
ⅩⅢ.The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body,or a certain mode of extension actually existing and nothing else47
Corollary47
Note47
AXIOMS Ⅰ.,Ⅱ48
LEMMAS Ⅰ.-Ⅲ.48
Corollary49
AXIOMS Ⅰ.-Ⅲ.50
LEMMAS Ⅳ.-Ⅶ.50
Note51
POSTULATES Ⅰ.-Ⅵ.52
ⅩⅣ.The human mind is apt to perceive many things,and more so according as its body can be disposed in more ways52
ⅩⅤ.The idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple,but composed of many ideas53
ⅩⅥ.The idea of every mode in which the human body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human body and at the same time the nature of the external body53
Corollaries53
ⅩⅦ.If the human body is affected in a mode which involves the nature of any external body,the human mind regards that external body as actually existing,or as present to itself until the body is affected by a modification which cuts off the existence or presence of that body53
Corollary54
Note54
ⅩⅧ.If the human body has once been affected at the same time by two or more bodies,when the mind after wards remembers any one of them it will straightway remember the others55
Note55
ⅩⅨ.The human mind has no knowledge of the human body,nor does it know it to exist save through ideas of modifications by which the body is affected56
ⅩⅩ.The idea or knowledge of the human mind is granted in God and follows in God in the same manner,and is referred to God in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the human body57
ⅩⅪ.This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same manner as the mind is united to the body57
Note58
ⅩⅫ.The human mind perceives not only the modifications of the body,but also the ideas of these modifications58
ⅩⅩⅢ.The mind has no knowledge of itself save in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body58
ⅩⅩⅣ.The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the component parts of the human body59
ⅩⅩⅤ.The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body60
ⅩⅩⅥ.The human mind perceives no external body as actually existing save through ideas of modifications of its body60
Corollary60
ⅩⅩⅦ.The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human body itself60
ⅩⅩⅧ.The ideas of the modifications of the human body,in so far as they are referred to the human mind alone,are not clear and distinct but confused61
Note61
ⅩⅩⅨ.The idea of the idea of each modification of the human mind does not involve adequate knowledge of the human mind61
Corollary62
Note62
ⅩⅩⅩ.We can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body62
ⅩⅩⅪ.We can only have a very Inadequate knowledge of individual things which are outside us63
Corollary63
ⅩⅩⅫ.All ideas,in so far as they have reference to God,are true63
ⅩⅩⅩⅢ.There is nothing positive in ideas,wherefore they could be called false63
ⅩⅩⅩⅣ.Every idea in us which is absolute,or adequate and perfect,is true63
ⅩⅩⅩⅤ.Falsity consists in privation of knowledge which is involved by inadequate or mutilated and confused ideas64
Note64
ⅩⅩⅩⅥ.Inadequate and confused ideas follow from the same necessity as adequate or clear and distinct ideas64
ⅩⅩⅩⅦ.That which is common to all,and that which is equally in a part and in the whole,do not constitute the essence of an individual thing65
ⅩⅩⅩⅧ.Those things which are common to all,and which are equally in a part and in the whole,can only be conceived as adequate65
Corollary65
ⅩⅩⅩⅨ.That which is common to and a property of the human body,and certain external bodies by which the human body is used to be affected,and which is equally in the part and whole of these,has an adequate idea in the mind66
Corollary66
ⅩL.Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas which are adequate in the mind,are also adequate66
Notes66
ⅩLⅠ.Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity;knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true69
ⅩLⅡ.Knowledge of the second and third kinds and not of the first kind teaches us to distinguish the true from the false69
ⅩLⅢ.He who has a true idea,knows at that same time that he has a true idea,nor can he doubt concerning the truth of the thing69
Note70
ⅩLⅣ.It is not the nature of reason to regard things as contingent but necessary71
Corollaries71
Note71
ⅩLⅤ.Every idea of every body or individual thing actually existing necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God72
Note73
ⅩLⅥ.The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which each idea involves is adequate and perfect73
ⅩLⅦ.The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God73
Note74
ⅩLⅧ.There is in no mind absolute or free will,but the mind is determined for willing this or that by a cause which is determined in its turn by another cause,and this one again by another,and so on to infinity74
Note75
ⅩLⅨ.There Is in the mind no volition or affirmation and negation save that which the idea,in so far as it is an idea,involves75
Corollary76
Note76
PART Ⅲ CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS83
DEFINITIONS84
Ⅰ.Adequate Cause (adaquata causa);Inadequate or Partial (inaiaquata sen partialis)84
Ⅱ.Action and Passion84
Ⅲ.Emotion (affectus)84
POSTULATES Ⅰ.,Ⅱ.85
PROPOSITIONS85
Ⅰ.Our mind acts certain things and suffers others:namely,in so far as it has adequate ideas,thus far it necessarily acts certain things,and in so far as it has inadequate ideas,thus far it necessarily suffers certain things85
Corollary86
Ⅱ.The body cannot determine the mind to think,nor the mind the body to remain in motion,or at rest,or in any other state (if there be any other)86
Note86
Ⅲ.The actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone,but passions depend on inadequate ideas alone90
Note90
Ⅳ.Nothing can be destroyed save by an external cause90
Ⅴ.Things are contrary by nature,that is,they cannot exist in the same subject in so far as one can destroy the other90
Ⅵ.Everything in so far as it is in itself endeavours to per sist in its own being91
Ⅶ.The endeavour wherewith a thing endeavours to per sist in its being is nothing else than the actual essence of that thing91
Ⅷ.The endeavour wherewith a thing endeavours to persist in its own being involves no finite time but an indefinite time91
Ⅸ.The mind,in so far as it has both clear and distinct and confused ideas,endeavours to persist in its being for an indefinite period,and is conscious of this its endeavour92
Note92
Ⅹ.The idea which cuts off the existence of our body cannot be given in our mind,but is contrary thereto92
Ⅺ.Whatever increases or diminishes,helps or hinders the power of action of our body,the idea thereof increases or diminishes,helps or hinders the power of thinking of our mind93
Note93
Ⅻ.The mind,as much as it can,endeavours to imagine those things which increase or help its power of acting.94
ⅩⅢ.When the mind imagines things which diminish or hinder the power of acting of the body,it endeavours as much as it can to remember things which will cut off their existence94
Corollary5
Note95
ⅩⅣ.If the mind were once affected at the same time by two emotions,when afterwards it is affected by one of them it will be also affected by the other95
ⅩⅤ.Anything can accidentally be the cause of pleasure,pain,or desire95
Corollary96
Note96
ⅩⅥ.From the fact alone that we imagine anything which has something similar to an object which is wont to affect the mind with pleasure or pain,although that in which the thing is similar to the object be not the effecting cause of those emotions,nevertheless we shall hate or love it accordingly96
ⅩⅦ.If we imagine a thing which is wont to affect us with the emotion of sadness to have something similar to another thing which equally affects us with the emotion of pleasure,we will hate and love that thing at the same time96
Note97
ⅩⅧ.A man is affected with the same emotion of pleasure or pain from the image of a thing past or future as from the image of a thing present97
Notes98
ⅩⅨ.He will be saddened who Imagines that which he loves to be destroyed:if he imagines it to be preserved he is rejoiced98
ⅩⅩ.He will be rejoiced who imagines what he hates to be destroyed99
ⅩⅪ.He who imagines that which he loves to be affected by pleasure or pain,will also be affected by pleasure or pain:and these will be greater or less in the lover according as they are greater or less in the thing loved99
ⅩⅫ.If we imagine anything to affect with pleasure what we love,we are affected with love towards it:and,on the other hand,if we imagine anything to affect it with pain,we are affected with hatred towards it100
Note100
ⅩⅩⅢ.He will be rejoiced who imagines that which he hates to be affected with pain;if,on the other hand,he imagines it to be affected with pleasure,he will be saddened:and these emotions will be greater or less according as the contrary emotions were greater or less in the things hated100
Note101
ⅩⅩⅣ.If we imagine any one to affect a thing we hate with pleasure,we are affected with hatred towards that person.If,on the other hand,we imagine him to affect it with pain,we are affected with love towards him101
Note101
ⅩⅩⅤ.We endeavour to affirm,concerning ourselves or what we love,everything that we imagine to affect what we love or ourselves with pleasure;and,on the other hand,we endeavour to deny,concerning ourselves and the object loved,everything that we imagine to affect us or the object loved with pain101
ⅩⅩⅥ.We endeavour to affirm,concerning a thing that we hate,that which we imagine will affect it with pain,and,on the contrary,to deny all that which we imagine will affect it with pleasure102
Note102
ⅩⅩⅦ.By the fact that we imagine a thing which is like ourselves,and which we have not regarded with any emotion to be affected with any emotion,we also are affected with a like emotion102
Notes103
Corollaries103
ⅩⅩⅧ.We endeavour to promote the being of everything that we imagine conducive to pleasure;but what we find repugnant or conducive to pain we endeavour to remove or destroy103
ⅩⅩⅨ.We also shall endeavour to do everything which we imagine men to regard with pleasure,and,on the other hand,we shall be averse to doing what we imagine men to turn away from104
Note104
ⅩⅩⅩ.If any one has done anything which he imagines to affect others with pleasure,he will be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as the cause,or he will regard himself with pleasure.On the other hand,if he has done anything which he imagines to affect the others with pain,he regards himself then with pain105
Note105
ⅩⅩⅪ.If we imagine any one to love,desire,or hate anything which we ourselves love,hate,or desire,by that very fact we shall love,hate,or desire it the more.But,on the other hand,if we imagine that what we love is avoided by some one,then we undergo a wavering of the mind105
Corollary106
Note106
ⅩⅩⅫ.If we imagine any one to enjoy anything which only one can possess,we shall endeavour to bring it to pass that he does not possess it106
Note106
ⅩⅩⅩⅢ.When we love a thing similar to ourselves,we endeavour as much as possible to bring it about that it also should love us107
ⅩⅩⅩⅣ.The greater the emotion with which we imagine a thing loved to be affected towards us,the greater will be our vanity107
ⅩⅩⅩⅤ.If any one imagines that the thing loved is joined to another than himself with the same or a faster bond of love than that which binds it to him,he will be affected with hatred towards the object loved,and envy towards the other108
Note108
ⅩⅩⅩⅥ.He who recollects a thing which he once enjoyed,desires to possess it under the same circumstances as those with which he first enjoyed it109
Corollary109
Note109
ⅩⅩⅩⅦ.The desire which arises by reason of sadness,joy,hatred,or love,is greater according as the emotion is greater109
ⅩⅩⅩⅧ.If any one begins to hate a thing loved so that his love for it is clearly laid aside,he will bear greater hatred towards it on that very account than if he had never loved it,and the more so according as his former love was greater110
ⅩⅩⅩⅨ.He who hates any one will endeavour to do him harm unless he fears to receive a greater harm from him;and,on the other hand,he who loves some one will by the same law endeavour to do him good110
Note111
ⅩL.He who imagines himself to be hated by another,and believes that he has given the other no cause for hatred,will hate that person in return111
Notes112
Corollaries112
ⅩLⅠ.If any one imagines himself to be loved by some one else,and does not believe that he has given any cause for this love,he shall love that person in return113
Notes113
Corollary113
ⅩLⅡ.He who confers a benefit on any one moved by love,or by the hope of honour,will be saddened if he sees that the benefit is received with ingratitude113
ⅩLⅢ.Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred,and,on the other hand,can be destroyed by love114
ⅩLⅣ.Hatred which is entirely conquered by love passes into love,and love on that account is greater than if it had not been preceded by hatred114
Note114
ⅩLⅤ.If one imagines that any one similar to himself is affected with hatred towards another thing similar to himself whom he himself loves,then he will hate the first of these two115
ⅩLⅥ.If any one has been affected with pleasure or pain by another person of a class or nation different to his own,and that accompanied by the idea of that person under the general name of that class or nation as the cause of the pleasure or pain,he will love or hate not only that person,but all of that class or nation115
ⅩLⅦ.Joy which arises from the fact that we imagine a thing which we hate to be destroyed or affected by some evil never arises without some pain in us115
Note115
ⅩLⅧ.Love and hatred,for example,towards Peter,are destroyed,if the pain which the latter involves,and the pleasure which the former involves,are connected to the idea of another thing as a cause;and each of them will be diminished in so far as we imagine Peter not to be the only cause of either116
ⅩLⅨ.Love or hatred towards a thing which we imagine to be free must be greater than the love or hatred towards a necessary thing,provided both are subject to the same cause116
Note117
L.Anything can be accidentally the cause of hope or fear117
Note117
LⅠ.Different men can be affected by one and the same object in different manners,and one and the same man can be affected by one and the same object in different ways at different times117
Note118
LⅡ.We cannot regard an object which we have seen before together with some others,or which we imagine to have nothing that is not common to many,as long as one which we imagine to have something singular about it119
Note119
LⅢ.When the mind regards itself and its power of acting it is rejoiced,and the more so the more distinctly it imagines itself and its power of acting 120 Corollary120
LⅣ.The mind endeavours to imagine those things only which impose its power of action on it121
LⅤ.When the mind imagines its want of power it is saddened by that fact121
Corollaries121
Notes121
LⅥ.There are as many species of pleasure,pain,desire,and consequently any emotion which is composed of these,such as wavering of the mind,or which is derived from these,such as love,fear,hope,hatred,etc.,as there are species of objects by which we are affected123
Note124
LⅦ.Any emotion of every individual differs from the emotion of another only in so far as the essence of one differs from the essence of another124
Note125
LⅧ.Besides pleasure and desire which are passions,there are other emotions of pleasure and pain which refer to us in so far as we are active125
LⅨ.Among all the emotions which have reference to the mind,in so far as it is active,there are none which have not reference to pleasure or desire126
Note126
DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS128
Ⅰ.Desire (cupiditas)128
Ⅱ.Pleasure (laetitia)128
Ⅲ.Pain (tristitia)128
Ⅳ.Wonder (admiratio)129
Ⅴ.Contempt130
Ⅵ.Love (amor)130
Ⅶ.Hatred (odium)130
Ⅷ.Inclination (propensio)130
Ⅸ.Aversion (aversio)130
Ⅹ.Devotion (devotio)131
Ⅺ.Derision (irrisio)131
Ⅻ.Hope (spes)131
ⅩⅢ.Fear (metus)131
ⅩⅣ.Confidence (securitas)131
ⅩⅤ.Despair (desperatio).131
ⅩⅥ.Joy (gaudium)132
ⅩⅦ.Disappointment (conscientiae morsus)132
ⅩⅧ.Pity (commiseratio)132
ⅩⅨ.Favour (favor)132
ⅩⅩ.Indignation (indignatio)132
ⅩⅪ.Partiality (existimatio)133
ⅩⅫ.Disparagement (despectus)133
ⅩⅩⅢ.Envy (invidia)133
ⅩⅩⅣ.Compassion (misericordia)133
ⅩⅩⅤ.Self-complacency (acquiescentia in seipso)133
ⅩⅩⅥ.Humility (humilitas)133
ⅩⅩⅦ.Repentance (pcenitentia)133
ⅩⅩⅧ.Pride (superbia)134
ⅩⅩⅨ.Self-despising or dejection (abjectio)135
ⅩⅩⅩ.Honour or glory (gloria)135
ⅩⅩⅪ.Shame (pudor)135
ⅩⅩⅫ.Regret (desiderium)136
ⅩⅩⅩⅢ.Emulation (aemulatio)136
ⅩⅩⅩⅣ.Gratefulness or gratitude (gratia seu gratitudo)137
ⅩⅩⅩⅤ.Benevolence (benevolentia)137
ⅩⅩⅩⅥ.Anger (ira)137
ⅩⅩⅩⅦ.Vengeance (vindicta)137
ⅩⅩⅩⅧ.Cruelty or savageness (crudelitas seu soevitas)137
ⅩⅩⅩⅨ.Timidity (timor)137
ⅩL.Daring (audacia)137
ⅩLⅠ.Cowardice (pusillanimitas)137
ⅩLⅡ.Consternation (consternatio)138
ⅩLⅢ.Politeness or modesty (humanitas seu modestia)138
ⅩLⅣ.Ambition (ambitio)138
ⅩLⅤ.Luxury (luxuria)138
ⅩLⅥ.Drunkenness (ebrietas)138
ⅩLⅦ.Avarice (avaritia)138
ⅩLⅧ.Lust (libido)138
GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS139
PART Ⅳ ON HUMAN SERVITUDE,OR THE STRENGTH OP THE EMOTIONS141
PREFACE141
DEFINITIONS145
Ⅰ.Good (bonum)144
Ⅱ.Bad (malum)144
Ⅲ.Contingent individual things (contingentes)144
Ⅳ.Possible individual things (possibiles)144
Ⅴ.Contrary Emotions (affectus contrarii)144
Ⅵ.Emotion towards a thing future,present,or past144
Ⅶ.End (finis)145
Ⅷ.Virtue (virtus)145
AXIOM145
PROPOSITIONS145
Ⅰ.Nothing positive,which a false idea has,Is removed from the presence of what is true in so far as it is true145
Note145
Ⅱ.We are passive in so far as we are a part of nature which cannot be conceived through itself without others146
Ⅲ.The force with which man persists in existing is limited,and is far surpassed by the power of external causes146
Ⅳ.It cannot happen that a man should not be a part of nature,and that he should be able not to suffer changes,save those which can be understood through his nature alone,and of which he is the adequate cause147
Corollary148
Ⅴ.The force and increase of any passion,and its persistence in existing,are not defined by the power whereby we endeavour to persist in existing,but by the power of an external cause compared with our own148
Ⅵ.The force of any passion or emotion can so surpass the rest of the actions or the power of a man that the emotion adheres obstinately to him148
Ⅶ.An emotion can neither be hindered nor removed save by a contrary emotion and one stronger in checking emotion148
Corollary149
Ⅷ.The knowledge of good or evil is nothing else than the emotion of pleasure or pain,in so far as we are conscious of it149
Ⅸ.An emotion whose cause we imagine to be with us at the present is stronger than if we did not imagine it to be present149
Note150
Corollary150
Ⅹ.Towards a future thing which we imagine to be close at hand we are more intensely affected than if we imagine the time of its existing to be further distant from the present;and by the recollection of a thing which we imagine to have passed not long ago we are more intensely affected also than if we imagine it to have passed long ago150
Note151
Ⅺ.The emotion towards a thing which we imagine to be necessary is more intense,coeteris paribus,than towards a thing possible,contingent,or not necessary151
Ⅻ.The emotion towards a thing which we know to be non existent at the present time,and which we imagine possible,is more intense,coeteris paribus,than that towards a thing contingent151
Corollary151
ⅩⅢ.Emotion towards a thing contingent,which we know does not exist in the present,is far more mild,coeteris paribus,than emotion towards a thing past152
ⅩⅣ.A true knowledge of good and evil cannot restrain any emotion in so far as the knowledge is true,but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion152
ⅩⅤ.Desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil can be destroyed or checked by many other desires which arise from emotions by which we are assailed152
ⅩⅥ.The desire which arises from the knowledge of good and evil,in so far as this knowledge has reference to the future,can more easily be checked or destroyed than the desire of things which are pleasing in the present153
ⅩⅦ.Desire which arises from true knowledge of good and evil,in so far as this concerns things contingent,can be far more easily restrained than the desire for things which are present153
Note153
ⅩⅧ.Desire which arises from pleasure is stronger,coeteris paribus,than the desire which arises from pain154
Note154
ⅩⅨ.Each one necessarily desires or turns from,by the laws of his nature,what he thinks to be good or evil156
ⅩⅩ.The more each one seeks what is useful to him,that is,the more he endeavours and can preserve his being,the more he is endowed with virtue;and,on the contrary,the more one neglects to preserve what is useful,or his being,he is thus far impotent or powerless156
Note156
ⅩⅪ.No one can desire to be blessed,to act well,or live well,who at the same time does not desire to be,to act,and to live,that is,actually to exist157
ⅩⅫ.No virtue can be conceived as prior to this virtue of endeavouring to preserve oneself157
Corollary157
ⅩⅩⅢ.Man,in so far as he is determined to do anything,by the fact that he has inadequate ideas cannot absolutely be said to act from virtue,but only in so far as he is determined by the fact that he understands157
ⅩⅩⅣ.To act absolutely according to virtue is nothing else in us than to act under the guidance of reason,to live so,and to preserve one's being (these three have the same meaning) on the basis of seeking what is useful to oneself158
ⅩⅩⅤ.No one endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of anything else158
ⅩⅩⅥ.Whatever we endeavour to do under the guidance of reason is nothing else than to understand;nor does the mind,in so far as it uses reason,judge anything useful to itself save what is conducive to understanding158
ⅩⅩⅦ.We know nothing to be certainly good or evil save what is truly conducive to understanding or what pre vents us from understanding159
ⅩⅩⅧ.The greatest good of the mind is the knowledge of God,and the greatest virtue of the mind is to know God159
ⅩⅩⅨ.Any individual thing whose nature is altogether different to ours can aid or hinder our power of under standing,and absolutely nothing can be either good or bad save if it have something in common with us160
ⅩⅩⅩ.Nothing can be bad through that which it has in common with our nature;but in so far as it is bad,thus far it is contrary to us160
ⅩⅩⅪ.In so far as anything agrees with our nature,thus far it is necessarily good161
Corollary161
ⅩⅩⅫ.In so far as men are liable to passions they cannot thus far be said to agree in nature161
Note161
ⅩⅩⅩⅢ.Men can differ in nature in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are passions,and thus far one and the same man is variable and inconstant162
ⅩⅩⅩⅣ.Men,in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are passions,can be contrary one to the other162
Note162
ⅩⅩⅩⅤ.In so far as men live under the guidance of reason,thus far only they always necessarily agree in nature163
Corollaries164
Note164
ⅩⅩⅩⅥ.The greatest good of those who follow virtue is common to all,and all can equally enjoy it165
Note165
ⅩⅩⅩⅦ.The good which each one who follows virtue desires for himself,he also desires for other men,and the more so the more knowledge he has of God165
Notes166
ⅩⅩⅩⅧ.That is useful to man which so disposes the human body that it can be affected in many modes,or which renders it capable of affecting external bodies in many modes,and the more so according as it readers the body more apt to be affected in many modes or to affect other bodies so;and,on the contrary,that is harmful (noxius) to man which renders the body less apt for this169
ⅩⅩⅩⅨ.Whatever brings it to pass that the proportion of motion and rest which the parts of the human body hold one to the other is preserved,is good;and contrariwise,that is bad which brings it about that the parts of the human body have another proportion mutually of motion and rest169
Note170
ⅩL.Whatever is conducive of the common society of men,or whatever brings it about that men live together in peace and agreement,is useful,and,on the contrary,that is bad which induces discord in the state171
ⅩLⅠ.Pleasure clearly is not evil but good;but pain,on the contrary,is clearly evil171
ⅩLⅡ.There cannot be too much merriment,but it is always good;but,on the other hand,melancholy is always bad171
ⅩLⅢ.Titillation can be excessive and be bad;but grief may be good in so far as titillation or pleasure is bad171
ⅩLⅣ.Love and desire can be excessive172
Note172
ⅩLⅤ.Hatred can never be good173
Notes173
Corollaries173
ⅩLⅥ.He who lives under the guidance of reason endeavours as much as possible to repay his fellow's hatred,rage,contempt,etc.,with love and nobleness174
Note174
ⅩLⅦ.The emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves good175
Note175
ⅩLⅧ.The emotions of partiality and disparagement are always bad175
ⅩLⅨ.Partiality easily renders the man who is over-estimated,proud175
L.Pity in a man who lives under the guidance of reason is in itself bad and useless175
Corollary176
Note176
LⅠ.Favour is not opposed to reason,but can agree with it and arise from it176
Mote176
LⅡ.Self-complacency can arise from reason,and that self-complacency which arises from reason alone is the greatest177
Note177
LⅢ.Humility is not a virtue if it does not arise from reason 177 LIV.Repentance is not a virtue,or,in other words,it does not arise from reason,but he who repents of an action is twice as unhappy or as weak as before178
LⅣ.Repentance is not a virtue,or,in other words,it does not arise from reason,but he who repents of an action is twice as unhappy or as weak as before178
Note178
LⅤ.The greatest pride or dejection is the greatest ignorance of self178
LⅥ.The greatest pride or dejection indicates the greatest weakness of mind178
Corollary179
Note179
LⅦ.A proud man loves the presence of parasites or flatterers,but the presence of noble people he hates179
Note179
LⅧ.Honour is not opposed to reason,but can arise from it180
Note180
LⅨ.For all actions for which we are determined by an emotion which is a passion we can be determined without that emotion by reason alone181
Note182
LⅩ.Desire which arises from pleasure or pain which has reference to one or certain parts of the body has no advantage to man as a whole183
Note183
LⅪ.Desire which arises from reason can have no excess183
LⅫ.In so far as the mind conceives a thing according to the dictate of reason,it will be equally affected whether the idea be of a thing present,past,or future184
Note184
LⅩⅢ.He that is led by fear to do good in order to avoid evil is not led by reason184
Notes185
Corollary185
LⅩⅣ.The knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge185
Corollary186
LⅩⅤ.Under the guidance of reason we follow the greater of two things which are good and the lesser of two things which are evil186
Corollary186
LⅩⅥ.Under the guidance of reason we desire a greater future good before a lesser present one,and a lesser evil in the present"before a greater in the future"(Van Vloten's version)186
Corollary186
Note186
LⅩⅦ.A free man thinks of nothing less than of death,and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life187
LⅩⅧ.If men were born free they would form no conception of good and evil as long as they were free187
Note187
LⅩⅨ.The virtue of a free man appears equally great in refusing to face difficulties as in overcoming them188
Corollary188
Note188
LⅩⅩ.A free man who lives among ignorant people tries as much as he can to refuse their benefits188
Note189
LⅩⅪ.Only free men are truly grateful one to the other189
Note189
LⅩⅫ.A free man never acts by fraud,but always with good faith189
Note190
LⅩⅩⅢ.A man who is guided by reason is more free in a state where he lives according to common law than in solitude where he is subject to no law190
Note190
APPENDIX191
PART Ⅴ CONCERNING THE POWER OF THE INTELLECT OR HUMAN FREEDOM199
PREFACE199
AXIOMS Ⅰ.,Ⅱ.202
PROPOSITIONS202
Ⅰ.Just as thoughts and the ideas of the mind are arranged and connected in the mind,so in the body its modifications or the modifications of things are arranged and connected according to their order202
Ⅱ.If we remove disturbance of the mind or emotion from the thought of an external cause and unite it to other thoughts,then love or hatred towards the external cause,as well as waverings of the mind which arise from these emotions,are destroyed202
Ⅲ.An emotion which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it203
Corollary203
Ⅳ.There is no modification of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct conception203
Corollary203
Note203
Ⅴ.Emotion towards a thing which we imagine simply and not as necessary nor possible nor contingent is,coeteris paribus,the greatest of all204
Ⅵ.In so far as the mind understands all things as necessary it has more power over the emotions or is less passive to them205
Note205
Ⅶ.Emotions which arise or are excited by reason,if we regard time,are greater than those which are referred to individual things which we regard as absent205
Ⅷ.The more an emotion is excited by many emotions concurring at the same time,the greater it will be206
Note206
Ⅸ.Emotion which has reference to many different causes which the mind regards at the same time as the emotion itself is less harmful,and we are less passive to it and less affected toward each cause than another emotion equally great which has reference to one alone or fewer causes206
Ⅹ.As long as we are not assailed by emotions which are contrary to our nature we are able to arrange and connect the modifications of the body according to their intellectual order206
Note207
Ⅺ.The more any image has reference to many things,the more frequent it is,the more often it nourishes,and the more it occupies the mind209
Ⅻ.The images of things are more easily joined to images which have reference to things which we understand clearly and distinctly than to others209
ⅩⅢ.The more an image is associated with many other things,the more often it flourishes209
ⅩⅣ.The mind can bring it to pass that all the modifications of the body or images of things have reference to the idea of God209
ⅩⅤ.He who understands himself and his emotions loves God,and the more so the more he understands himself and his emotions209
ⅩⅥ.This love towards God must occupy the mind chiefly210
ⅩⅦ.God is free from passions,nor is he affected with any emotion of pleasure or pain210
Corollary210
ⅩⅧ.No one can hate God210
Corollary210
Note210
ⅩⅨ.He who loves God cannot endeavour to bring it about that God should love him in return211
ⅩⅩ.This love towards God cannot be polluted by an emotion either of envy or jealousy,but it is cherished the more,the more we imagine men to be bound to God by this bond of love211
Note211
ⅩⅪ.The mind can imagine nothing nor recollect past things save while in the body213
ⅩⅫ.In God,however,there is necessarily granted the idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the species of eternity213
ⅩⅩⅢ.The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the human body,but there is some part of it that remains eternal213
Note214
ⅩⅩⅣ.The more we understand individual things,the more we understand God214
ⅩⅩⅤ.The greatest endeavour of the mind and its greatest virtue is to understand things by the third class of knowledge214
ⅩⅩⅥ.The more apt the mind is to understand things by the third class of knowledge,the more it desires to understand things by this class of knowledge215
ⅩⅩⅦ.From this third class of knowledge the greatest possible mental satisfaction arises215
ⅩⅩⅧ.The endeavour or desire of knowing things accord ing to the third class of knowledge cannot arise from the first but the second class of knowledge215
ⅩⅩⅨ.Whatever the mind understands under the species of eternity it does not understand owing to the fact that it conceives the actual present existence of the body,but owing to the fact that it conceives the essence of the body under the species of eternity216
Note216
ⅩⅩⅩ.The human mind in so far as it knows itself and its body under the species of eternity,thus far it necessarily has knowledge of God,and knows that it exists in God and is conceived through God216
ⅩⅩⅪ.The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind as its formal cause in so far as the mind is eternal217
Note217
ⅩⅩⅫ.Whatever we understand according to the third class of knowledge we are pleased with,and that accom panied with the idea of God as the cause217
Corollary218
ⅩⅩⅩⅢ.The intellectual love towards God which arises from the third kind of knowledge is eternal218
Note218
ⅩⅩⅩⅣ.The mind is only liable to emotions which are referred to passions while the body lasts218
Corollary218
Note218
ⅩⅩⅩⅤ.God loves himself with infinite intellectual love219
ⅩⅩⅩⅥ.The mental intellectual love towards God is the very love of God with which God loves himself,not in so far as he is infinite,but in so far as he can be expressed through the essence of the human mind considered under the species of eternity,that is,mental intellectual love towards God is part of the infinite love with which God loves himself219
Corollary219
Note219
ⅩⅩⅩⅦ.There is nothing in nature which is contrary to this intellectual love or which can remove it220
Note220
ⅩⅩⅩⅧ.The more the mind understands things by the second and third kinds of knowledge,the less it will be passive to emotions which are evil,and the less it will fear death220
Note221
ⅩⅩⅩⅨ.He who has a body capable of many things,has a mind of which the greater part is eternal221
Note221
ⅩL.The more perfection anything has,the more active and the less passive it is;and contrariwise,the more active it is,the more perfect it becomes222
Corollary222
Note222
ⅩLⅠ.Although we did not know that our mind is eternal,we would hold before all things piety and religion,and absolutely all things which we have shown in Part IV.to have reference to courage and nobility223
Note223
ⅩLⅡ.Blessedness is not the reward of virtue,but virtue itself:nor should we rejoice in it for that we restrain our lusts,but,on the contrary,because we rejoice therein we can restrain our lusts223
Note224
TREATISE ON THE CORRECTION OF THE UNDERSTANDING227
Ⅰ.On the Good Things which Men desire for the most Part227
Ⅱ.On the True and Supreme Good229
Ⅲ.Certain Rules of Life231
Ⅳ.On the Four Modes of Perception232
Ⅴ.On the Best Mode of Perception234
Ⅵ.On the Instruments of the Understanding,True Ideas235
Ⅶ.On the Right Method of Knowing237
Ⅷ.First Part of the Method-On Fictitious Ideas241
Ⅸ.On the False Idea248
Ⅹ.On the Doubtful Idea252
Ⅺ.On Memory and Forgetfulness-Conclusion253
Ⅻ.Second Part of the Method-On Double Perception256
ⅩⅢ.On the Conditions of Definition258
ⅩⅣ.Of the Means by which Eternal Things are known259
ⅩⅤ.On the Power of the Understanding and its Properties261
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