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MERGERS AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL2025|PDF|Epub|mobi|kindle电子书版本百度云盘下载

MERGERS AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
  • FRED S.MCCHESNEY 著
  • 出版社： AN ELGAR RESEARCH COLLECTION
  • ISBN：1849801363
  • 出版时间：2011
  • 标注页数：666页
  • 文件大小：32MB
  • 文件页数：683页
  • 主题词：

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图书目录

PART Ⅰ BACKGROUND3

1.R.H. Coase (1937), 'The Nature of the Firm', Economica, 4 (16),November, 386-4053

PART Ⅱ THE PERCEIVED PROBLEM25

2.AdolfA. Berle, Jr and Gardiner C. Means (1933), 'The Divergence of Interest between Ownership and Control', in The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Chapter Ⅵ, New York, NY; Macmillan Company, 119-2525

3.Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976), 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure', Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (4), October, 305-6032

4.Michael C. Jensen (1986), 'Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance, and Takeovers', American Economic Review,76 (2), May, 323-988

PART Ⅲ MERGERS AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL97

5.Henry G. Manne (1965), 'Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control', Journal of Political Economy, 73 (2), April, 110-2097

6.William J. Carney (1999), 'The Legacy of"The Market for Corporate Control" and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm',Case Western Reserve Law Review, 50, Winter, 215-44108

7.Fred S. McChesney (1999), ‘Manne, Mergers, and the Market for Corporate Control', Case Western Reserve Law Review, 50, Winter,245-52138

PART Ⅳ HOW THE MARKET OPERATES: INTERNAL ISSUES149

8.Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1981), 'The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer',Harvard Law Review, 94 (6), April, 1161-204149

9.Lucian A. Bebchuk (1982), 'The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers', Harvard Law Review, 95 (5), March, 1028-56193

10.David D. Haddock, Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney (1987), 'Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers',Virginia Law Review, 73 (4), May, 701-46222

11.Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1982), 'Corporate Control Transactions', Yale Law Journal, 91 (4), March, 698-737268

12.Robert B. Thompson and Randall S. Thomas (2004), 'The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions', Vanderbilt Law Review, 57, 133-209308

PART Ⅴ HOW THE MARKET OPERATES: EXTERNAL ISSUES387

13.William J. Carney and Leonard A. Silverstein (2003), 'The Illusory Protections of the Poison Pill', Notre Dame Law Review, 79,179-220387

14.Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney (1985), 'A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail', Yale Law Journal, 95 (1),November, 13-61429

15.John C. Coates, Ⅳ (2001), 'Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers', California Law Review, 89 (5),October, 1301-421478

PART Ⅵ EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE601

16.Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback (1983), 'The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence', Journal of Financial Economics, 11 (1-4), April, 5-50601

17.Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley and Jeffry M. Netter (1988),'The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2 (1), Winter, 49-68647

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