PATENT POLICY LEGAL-ECONOMIC EFFECTS IN A NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK2025|PDF|Epub|mobi|kindle电子书版本百度云盘下载

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1 General introduction5

PART Ⅰ Patent systems and patent law5

2 Introduction7

3 A short history of the patent system8

3.1 A general overview8

3.1.1 The first patents9

3.1.2 The guilds in the middle ages9

3.1.3 The development in the United States11

3.2 lnternational patent treaties13

3.2.1 The Paris Convention13

3.2.2 The TRIPs Agreement15

3.2.3 The Patent Cooperation Treaty18

3.A Important development steps of patents19

4 Foundations of patent systems22

4.1 Natural rights theory22

4.1.1 John Locke and the natural rights theory22

4.1.2 Intellectual property and natural rights23

4.2 Utilitarian theory24

4.2.1 Jeremy Bentham and utilitarianism24

4.2.2 Utilitarianism and patent systems24

4.2.3 Two patent theories27

5 An introduction to patent law and policy instruments30

5.1 Thepatentsystem31

5.1.1 Patent prosecution31

5.1.2 Patent enforcement34

5.2 Legal policy instruments and their economic effects35

5.2.1 Patent prosecution35

5.2.2 Patent enforcement43

5.3 From patent law to economic modelling46

5.A A comparison of patent fees48

PART Ⅱ Patent policy from a national perspective49

6 Introduction51

7 The optimal patent term53

7.1 Patent maintenance54

7.2 Nordhaus’model of optimal unoCorm patent lofe55

7.2.1 Public vs private knowledge as the source for ideas55

7.2.2 The timing of the decisions56

7.2.3 The market stage57

7.2.4 The inventor’s research effort58

7.2.5 The optimal patent length60

7.3 Optimal renewal schemes63

7.3.1 Asymmetric information on the patent value63

7.3.2 The benchmark models64

7.3.3 Optimal differentiation policy67

7.A Proofs to the lemmata and propositions72

8 Patent scope74

8.1 Exogenous patent value75

8.1.1 The general framework75

8.1.2 General results79

8.1.3 The optimal policy design for horizontal product differentiation82

8.2 Endogenous patent value86

8.2.1 A patent race with endogenous research effort87

8.2.2 The optimal investment decision89

8.2.3 The socially optimal policy design90

8.3 Patent scope and costly imitation92

8.3.1 A model with endogenous research effort and costly imitation92

8.3.2 The firms’decisions93

8.3.3 The optimal patent length and patent scope when imitation is costly96

8.A Proofs to the lemmata and propositions97

9 Patent breadth100

9.1 A simple model without patent length101

9.1.1 A sequence of two inventions101

9.1.2 The optimal patent-anti-trust policy107

9.2 An infinite sequence of inventions with patent term112

9.2.1 A sequence of innovations and patent instruments112

9.2.2 A model of homogeneous tastes115

9.2.3 Heterogeneous tastes in a model of a natural oligopoly121

9.A Proofs to the lemmata and propositions127

10 The non-obviousness standard128

10.1 The basic framework of a model with an infinite sequence of patent races129

10.1.1 An infinite sequence of patent races129

10.1.2 Patentability and the non-obviousness standard130

10.1.3 Demand and prices132

10.1.4 The expected profits132

10.2 Firms and the optimal research effort133

10.2.1 The ex-post value functions133

10.2.2 The ex-ante value function136

10.2.3 The optimal research effort136

10.3 The optimal non-obviousness standard140

10.3.1 The ex-post version140

10.3.2 The ex-ante version142

10.4 The ease of invention144

10.A Proofs to the lemmata and propositions147

PART Ⅲ Patent policy in an international framework153

11 Introduction155

12 New patentable subject matters157

12.1 A simple model of new patentable subject matters158

12.1.1 Two firms engaged in a single patent race158

12.1.2 The domestic firm’s disadvantage159

12.1.3 The home country’s decision163

12.1.4 Shortcomings166

12.2 New patentable subject matters and endogenous research effort166

12.2.1 Basic assumptions167

12.2.2 The firms’value functions169

12.2.3 The firms’optimal choice173

12.2.4 The effect on firms178

12.2.5 The home country’s welfare functions180

12.2.6 Welfare considerations183

12.A Proofs to the lemmata and propositions183

13 Different non-obviousness standards188

13.1 The basic framework188

13.1.1 Patentability and the non-obviousness standard189

13.1.2 Demand and prices190

13.1.3 The firms’ position in an ex-post situation190

13.1.4 The expected profits191

13.2 Differences in the non-obviousness standard and their effect on firms193

13.2.1 The value functions193

13.2.2 The effect of a diverging domestic non-obviousness standard on firms196

13.3 The optimal non-obviousness standard198

13.3.1 The general forms of the social welfare functions198

13.3.2 The society’s unilateral decision202

13.3.3 Simultaneous decision205

13.4 Policy implications206

13.A Proofs to the lemmata and propositions208

Notes213

Bibliography223

Author index232