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Ⅰ Foundations1

1 Introduction3

1.1 A More Formal Introduction to IO7

1.1.1 The Demand for Industrial Organization10

1.2 Methodologies10

1.2.1 The New Industrial Organization10

1.2.2 The Theory of Business Strategy11

1.2.3 Antitrust Law12

1.3 Overview of the Text12

1.3.1 Foundations12

1.3.2 Monopoly12

1.3.3 Oligopoly Pricing13

1.3.4 Strategic Behavior14

1.3.5 Issues in Antitrust Economics15

1.3.6 Issues in Regulatory Economics16

1.4 Suggestions for Further Reading16

2 The Welfare Economics of Market Power19

2.1 Profit Maximization20

2.2 Perfect Competition21

2.2.1 Supply22

2.2.2 Market Equilibrium23

2.3 Efficiency25

2.3.1 Measures of Gains from Trade25

2.3.2 Pareto Optimality28

2.4 Market Power29

2.4.1 Market Power and Pricing31

2.4.2 Measurement and Determinants of Market Power36

2.4.3 The Determinants of Deadweight Loss37

2.5 Market Power and Public Policy40

2.6 Chapter Summary42

2.7 Suggestions for Further Reading43

3 Theory of the Firm49

3.1 Neoclassical Theory of the Firm50

3.1.1 Review of Cost Concepts52

3.1.2 The Potential Advantages of Being Large54

3.1.3 Economies of Scale and Seller Concentration60

3.2 Why Do Firms Exist?62

3.2.1 Two Puzzles Regarding the Scope of a Firm62

3.2.2 Explanations for the Existence of Firms63

3.2.3 Alternative Economic Organizations65

3.2.4 Spot Markets65

3.2.5 Specific Investments and Quasi-Rents69

3.2.6 Contracts72

3.2.7 Complete vs.Incomplete Contracts73

3.2.8 Vertical Integration76

3.3 Limits to Firm Size81

3.3.1 The Paradox of Selective Intervention82

3.3.2 Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm84

3.4 Do Firms Profit Maximize?94

3.4.1 Shareholder Monitoring and Incentive Contracts95

3.4.2 External Limits to Managerial Discretion98

3.5 Chapter Summary101

3.6 Suggestions for Further Reading102

Ⅱ Monopoly109

4 Market Power and Dominant Firms111

4.1 Sources of Market Power113

4.1.1 Government Restrictions on Entry116

4.1.2 Structural Characteristics118

4.1.3 Strategic Behavior by Incumbents123

4.2 A Dominant Firm with a Competitive Fringe124

4.2.1 The Effect of Entry129

4.3 Durable Goods Monopoly130

4.3.1 The Coase Conjecture130

4.3.2 Pacman Economics141

4.3.3 Coase vs.Pacman143

4.3.4 Recycling144

4.4 Market Power:A Second Look145

4.4.1 X-Inefficiency145

4.4.2 Rent Seeking147

4.5 Benefits of Monopoly148

4.5.1 Scale Economies148

4.5.2 Research and Development148

4.6 Chapter Summary149

4.7 Suggestions for Further Reading150

5 Non-Linear Pricing and Price Discrimination155

5.1 Examples of Price Discrimination156

5.2 Mechanisms for Capturing Surplus158

5.3 Market Power and Arbitrage:Necessary Conditions for Price Discrimination160

5.4 Types of Price Discrimination161

5.4.1 First-Degree Price Discrimination162

5.4.2 Third-Degree Price Discrimination164

5.4.3 Second-Degree Price Discrimination166

5.4.4 General Non-Linear Pricing170

5.4.5 Optimal Non-Linear Pricing173

5.5 Antitrust Treatment of Price Discrimination177

5.6 Chapter Summary178

5.7 Suggestions for Further Reading179

6 Market Power and Product Quality183

6.1 Search Goods185

6.1.1 Monopoly Provision of Quality186

6.1.2 Quality Discrimination189

6.2 Experience Goods and Quality190

6.2.1 Moral Hazard and the Provision of Quality191

6.2.2 The Lemons Problem191

6.3 Signaling High Quality193

6.3.1 A Dynamic Model of Reputation for Quality193

6.3.2 Advertising as a Signal of Quality196

6.3.3 Warranties199

6.4 Chapter Summary202

6.5 Suggestions for Further Reading203

6.6 Appendix:The Complete Model of Quality Discrimination206

Ⅲ Oligopoly Pricing209

7 Game Theory Ⅰ211

7.1 Why Game Theory?212

7.2.3 Equilibrium Concepts215

7.2.2 Types of Games215

7.2.1 The Basic Elements of a Game215

7.2 Foundations and Principles215

7.2.4 Fundamental Assumptions216

7.3 Static Games of Complete Information216

7.3.1 Normal Form Representation216

7.3.2 Dominant and Dominated Strategies217

7.3.3 Rationalizable Strategies219

7.3.4 Nash Equilibrium220

7.3.5 Discussion and Interpretation of Nash Equilibria221

7.3.6 Mixed Strategies225

7.4 Chapter Summary226

7.5 Suggestions for Further Reading227

7.6 Appendix:Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Strategies230

8 Classic Models of Oligopoly231

8.1 Static Oligopoly Models232

8.2 Cournot233

8.2.1 Cournot Best-Response Functions and Residual Demand Functions234

8.2.2 Properties of the Cournot Equilibrium238

8.2.3 Free-Entry Cournot Equilibrium247

8.2.4 The Efficient Number of Competitors249

8.3 Bertrand Competition256

8.3.1 The Bertrand Paradox256

8.3.2 Product Differentiation258

8.3.3 Capacity Constraints264

8.4 Cournot vs.Bertrand270

8.5.1 Conjectural Variations272

8.5 Empirical Tests of Oligopoly272

8.6 Chapter Summary274

8.7 Suggestions for Further Reading275

8.8 Appendix:Best-Response Functions,Reaction Functions,and Stability279

8.8.1 Stability281

8.8.2 Uniqueness282

9 Game Theory Ⅱ283

9.1 Extensive Forms284

9.2 Strategies vs.Actions and Nash Equilibria286

9.3 Noncredible Threats287

9.3.1 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium287

9.3.2 The Centipede Game290

9.4 Two-Stage Games291

9.5.1 Finitely Repeated Stage Game292

9.5 Games of Almost Perfect Information292

9.5.2 Infinitely Repeated Stage Game293

9.6 Chapter Summary299

9.7 Suggestions for Further Reading299

9.8 Appendix:Discounting303

10 Dynamic Models of Oligopoly305

10.1 Reaching an Agreement308

10.1.1 Profitability of Collusion314

10.1.2 How Is an Agreement Reached?314

10.1.3 Factors That Complicate Reaching an Agreement318

10.2 Stronger,Swifter,More Certain328

10.3 Dynamic Games329

10.3.1 Credible Punishments and Subgame Perfection:Finite Games329

10.4 Supergames331

10.4.1 Subgame Perfection and Credible Threats:Infinite Game332

10.4.2 Harsher Punishment Strategies334

10.4.3 Renegotiation Proof Strategies340

10.5 Factors That Influence the Sustainability of Collusion340

10.6 Facilitating Practices348

10.6.1 Efficiency and Facilitating Practices355

10.7 Antitrust and Collusion355

10.8 Chapter Summary357

10.9 Suggestions for Further Reading358

11 Product Differentiation367

11.2 Monopolistic Competition369

11.2.1 Preference Specification369

11.1 What Is Product Differentiation?369

11.2.2 Monopolistic Competition:Equilibrium370

11.2.3 Too Many Brands of Toothpaste?373

11.3 Bias in Product Selection376

11.3.1 Asymmetric Preferences376

11.4 Address Models379

11.4.1 Consumer Preferences380

11.4.2 A Simple Address Model:Hotelling s Linear City381

11.4.3 Free Entry into the Linear City384

11.4.4 Localized Competition391

11.4.5 Efficiency of the Market Equilibrium391

11.4.6 Endogenous Pricing395

11.4.7 Pricing and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation402

11.5.1 Brand Proliferation404

11.5 Strategic Behavior404

11.5.2 Brand Specification407

11.5.3 Brand Preemption407

11.6 Oligopoly Equilibrium in Vertically Differentiated Markets411

11.7 Chapter Summary413

11.8 Suggestions for Further Reading415

12 Identifying and Measuring Market Power423

12.1 Structure,Conduct,and Performance425

12.1.1 SCP in Practice:The Framework426

12.1.2 SCP in Practice:The Results431

12.1.3 Critiques of SCP Studies432

12.2 The New Empirical Industrial Organization440

12.2.1 Structural Models440

12.2.2 Nonparametric,or Reduced-Form,Approaches451

12.3 The NEIO and SCP:A Summing Up452

12.4 Chapter Summary452

12.5 Suggestions for Further Reading454

Ⅳ Strategic Behavior457

13 An Introduction to Strategic Behavior459

13.1 Strategic Behavior461

13.1.1 Strategic vs.Tactical Choices465

13.2 The Stackelberg Game467

13.2.1 Stackelberg Equilibrium468

13.3 Entry Deterrence473

13.3.1 Constant Returns to Scale473

13.3.2 Economies of Scale474

13.4 Introduction to Entry Games478

13.4.1 Limit Pricing478

13.4.2 A Stylized Entry Game479

13.5 Chapter Summary481

13.6 Suggestions for Further Reading482

14 Entry Deterrence485

14.1 The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence487

14.1.1 Dixit s Model of Entry Deterrence488

14.1.2 Strategic Investment and Monopolization504

14.2 Contestable Markets507

14.2.1 Logical Possibility509

14.2.2 Robustness510

14.2.3 Empirical Relevance512

14.2.4 Contestability and Barriers to Entry512

14.3.1 Positive Definitions of Barriers to Entry513

14.3 Entry Barriers513

14.3.2 An Assessment of Barriers to Entry514

14.3.3 Normative Definitions of Entry Barriers517

14.4 Chapter Summary518

14.5 Suggestions for Further Reading519

15 Strategic Behavior:Principles525

15.1 Two-Stage Games526

15.2 Strategic Accommodation532

15.3 Strategic Entry Deterrence535

15.4 The Welfare Effects of Strategic Competition538

15.5 Chapter Summary539

15.6 Suggestions for Further Reading540

16.1 Learning by Doing543

16 Strategic Behavior:Applications543

16.1.1 Learning with Price Competition546

16.1.2 Learning and Entry Deterrence546

16.2 Switching Costs546

16.2.1 Strategic Manipulation of an Installed Base of Customers547

16.2.2 Incorporating New Buyers549

16.2.3 Endogenous Switching Costs549

16.3 Vertical Separation550

16.4 Tying551

16.5 Strategic Trade Policy Ⅰ:Export Subsidies to Regional Jets552

16.6 Strategic Trade Policy Ⅱ:The Kodak-Fujifilm Case553

16.7 Managerial Incentives554

16.8 Research and Development555

16.10 Chapter Summary556

16.9 The Coase Conjecture Revisited556

16.11 Suggestions for Further Reading557

17 Advertising and Oligopoly561

17.1 Normative vs.Positive Issues:The Welfare Economics of Advertising562

17.2 Positive Issues:Theoretical Analysis of Advertising and Oligopoly563

17.2.1 Advertising as an Exogenous Sunk Cost563

17.2.2 Advertising as an Endogenous Sunk Cost565

17.2.3 Cooperative and Predatory Advertising566

17.3 Advertising and Strategic Entry Deterrence567

17.4 A More General Treatment of Strategic Advertising:Direct vs.Indirect Effects567

17.5 Positive Issues:Advertising and Oligopoly Empirics569

17.6 Chapter Summary571

17.7 Suggestions for Further Reading571

18 Research and Development575

18.1 A Positive Analysis:Strategic R＆D577

18.2 Market Structure and Incentives for R＆D578

18.2.1 A More Careful View of Market Structure581

18.2.2 Patent Races582

18.2.3 Stochastic Patent Races585

18.2.4 Product Innovation and Patent Races586

18.3 Normative Analysis:The Economics of Patents588

18.3.1 Other Forms of Intellectual Property Protection:Copyrights and Trademarks591

18.4 Chapter Summary592

18.5 Suggestions for Further Reading593

Ⅴ Issues in Antitrust Economics597

19 The Theory of the Market599

19.1.1 Economic Markets601

19.1 The Concept of a Market601

19.1.2 Antitrust Markets602

19.2 Antitrust Markets:The Search for Market Power603

19.2.1 Market Power and Antitrust603

19.2.2 Market Power and Market Shares604

19.2.3 The Importance of Demand Elasticities605

19.2.4 Critical Elasticities of Demand607

19.2.5 Break-Even Elasticities of Demand608

19.2.6 Recent Developments:Innovation Markets612

19.3 The Practice of Market Definition612

19.3.1 Demand Elasticities612

19.3.2 The Structural Approach613

19.3.4 Qualitative Evaluative Criteria616

19.3.3 Shipment Flows616

19.4 Antitrust Markets in Monopolization Cases:The Cellophane Fallacy617

19.4.1 The Cellophane Fallacy and Mergers618

19.5 Chapter Summary618

19.6 Suggestions for Further Reading619

20 Exclusionary Strategies Ⅰ: Raising Rivals Costs625

20.1 A Simple Model of Raising Rivals Costs626

20.2 The Salop and Scheffman Model:Raising the Costs of a Competitive Fringe628

20.3 Accommodation vs.Deterrence Strategies630

20.4 A More General Treatment of Raising Rivals Costs:Direct vs.Indirect Effects634

20.5 Reducing Rivals Revenue635

20.6 Raising Rivals Costs in Antitrust639

20.7 Chapter Summary639

20.8 Suggestions for Further Reading640

21 Exclusionary Strategies Ⅱ: Predatory Pricing643

21.1 The Classic Chicago Attack on Predation645

21.2 Rational Theories of Predation647

21.2.1 The Long Purse648

21.2.2 Reputation Models649

21.2.3 Signaling Models of Predation653

21.2.4 Softening Up the Victim653

21.2.5 Predation in Learning and Network Industries653

21.3 Empirical Evidence on Predation654

21.3.1 Case Studies655

21.3.2 Experimental Evidence658

21.4 Predation in Antitrust659

21.4.1 Areeda-Turner and Cost-Based Definitions of Predation659

21.4.2 Major Antitrust Cases661

21.5 Chapter Summary662

21.6 Suggestions for Further Reading662

21.7 Appendix:An Introduction to Games of Incomplete Information670

21.7.1 Bayesian Games670

21.7.2 Extensive-Form Bayesian Games with Observable Actions672

21.7.3 Multiple but Finite Numbers of Victims in the Extortion Game677

22 Vertical Integration and Vertical Restraints683

22.1 Incentives for Vertical Merger(Vertical Integration)684

22.1.1 Transaction Economies684

22.1.2 Vertical Integration to Avoid Double Marginalization685

22.1.3 Vertical Integration with Perfect Competition Downstream:Fixed Proportions686

22.1.4 Vertical Integration with Perfect Competition Downstream:Variable Proportions687

22.2 Vertical Restraints688

22.2.1 Restraints on Intrabrand Competition690

22.2.2 Alternative Explanations of RPM and Exclusive Territorial Restrictions694

22.2.3 RPM,Exclusive Territories,and Welfare694

22.2.4 Antitrust Policy toward RPM and Exclusive Territories695

22.3 Contractual Exclusivity696

22.3.1 Tying Arrangements696

22.3.2 Exclusive Dealing704

22.4 Chapter Summary707

22.5 Suggestions for Further Reading708

22.6 Appendix:Price versus Non-Price Competition in the Winter Model711

23 Horizontal Mergers715

23.1 A Partial-Equilibrium Analysis of Horizontal Mergers717

23.1.2 The Use of the Herfindahl Index in Merger Analysis718

23.1.1 Price versus Efficiency:The Williamson Trade Off718

23.2 Equilibrium with Nonmerging Firms:A More General Analysis720

23.2.1 Mergers in Differentiated Markets722

23.3 The Coordinated Effects of Mergers724

23.4 Entry725

23.5 Mergers:The Antitrust Framework726

23.5.1 Merger Guidelines726

23.5.2 Market Definition726

23.5.3 Innovation Markets727

23.5.4 Entry and Product Repositioning728

23.5.5 Efficiencies:A Growing Emphasis729

23.5.6 Methodology:The Growing Role of Simulation in Antitrust Analysis732

23.6 Chapter Summary738

23.7 Suggestions for Further Reading739

23.8 Appendix:Bertrand Equilibrium with Three Differentiated Products741

Ⅵ Issues in Regulatory Economics745

24 Rationale for Regulation747

24.1 Public Interest Justifications for Regulatory Intervention750

24.1.1 The Market Failure Test752

24.1.2 Natural Monopoly752

24.1.3 Large Specific Investments765

24.2 The Economic Theories of Regulation769

24.2.1 The Theory of Economic Regulation769

24.2.2 Explaining Regulation Using a Principal-Agent Approach772

24.3 Chapter Summary775

24.4 Suggestions for Further Reading777

24.5 Appendix:Subadditivity and Multiproduct Firms781

25 Optimal Pricing for Natural Monopoly785

25.1 Efficient Pricing by a Single-Product Natural Monopolist786

25.1.1 First-Best Pricing786

25.1.2 Second-Best Pricing:Ramsey Prices788

25.1.3 First-vs.Second-Best Pricing788

25.2 Multiproduct Natural Monopoly788

25.2.1 Ramsey Pricing789

25.3 Peak-Load Pricing801

25.3.1 A Simple Illustrative Model of Peak-Load Pricing802

25.3.2 Optimal Capacity806

25.3.3 Discussion of Peak-Load Pricing808

25.4 Multipart Tariffs810

25.4.1 Two Common Examples of Multipart Tariffs812

25.4.2 The Coase Result814

25.4.3 N-Part Tariffs and a Menu of Two-Part Tariffs817

25.4.4 Pareto-Dominating Block Tariffs817

25.5 Chapter Summary821

25.6 Suggestions for Further Reading822

26 Issues in Regulation829

26.1 Regulation under Asymmetric Information831

26.1.1 The Full-Information Benchmark831

26.1.2 Asymmetric Information:The Importance of Distributional Considerations833

26.1.3 An Optimal Regulatory Mechanism:Hidden Information834

26.1.4 An Optimal Regulatory Mechanism:Hidden Action838

26.1.5 Implications for Regulatory Regimes839

26.2 Regulation in Practice840

26.2.1 Cost-of-Service Regulation841

26.2.2 An Assessment of COS Regulation847

26.2.3 Summary of Cost-of-Service Regulation852

26.2.4 Incentive Regulation852

26.2.5 Guidelines for Regulation860

26.3 Regulatory Reform in Network Industries861

26.3.1 Why Regulated Firms Should Be Kept Out of Unregulated Markets863

26.3.2 Access Pricing and Interconnection871

26.3.3 The Interconnection Problem871

26.3.4 The Efficient Component Pricing Rule872

26.3.5 Optimal Access Pricing873

26.4 Chapter Summary877

26.5 Suggestions for Further Reading879

A.1.1 The Sherman Act889

A.1 Antitrust in the United States889

Appendix The Legal Framework of Antitrust Enforcement889

A.1.2 The Clayton Act891

A.1.3 Enforcement in the U.S891

A.2 Competition Policy in Canada895

A.2.1 Criminal Provisions in the Competition Act895

A.2.2 The Director of Research and Investigation896

A.2.3 Noncriminal Reviewable Offenses896

A.3 Competition Policy of the European Union897

A.3.1 Enforcement in the EU898

A.4 Suggestions for Further Reading899

Selected Solutions for Odd Numbered Questions901

Index of Names909

Subject Index915