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Natural Law and Practical Rationality2025|PDF|Epub|mobi|kindle电子书版本百度云盘下载

Natural Law and Practical Rationality
  • Murphy 著
  • 出版社: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN:9780521802291;0521802296
  • 出版时间:2001
  • 标注页数:284页
  • 文件大小:14MB
  • 文件页数:295页
  • 主题词:

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图书目录

Introduction: Natural Law and the Theory of Practical Rationality1

0.1 Natural Law Theory an Account of Practical Rationality1

0.2 The Ways in Which This Work Is Incomplete3

1 The Real Identity Thesis6

1.1 Rival Views of How Goods Are Known6

Inclinationist and Derivationist Accounts of Fundamental Practical Knowledge6

Difficulties with Derivationism and Inclinationism13

The Real Identity Thesis Stated17

1.2 Functioning and Flourishing21

That the Human Has a Function: The Functional-Composition Thesis23

An Analysis of ‘Function’26

That the Human’s Functioning Is to Be Identified with Its Flourishing29

A Superfluous Concept?32

1.3 Knowledge of Human Flourishing34

Mentalism34

Statistical Normalcy35

Knowledge of Flourishing as Implicit in Particular Function Judgments36

1.4 The Real Identity Thesis40

Reasons to Affirm the Real Identity Thesis40

Aquinas’s Natural Law Theory and the Real Identity Thesis43

2 Well-Being46

2.1 Natural Law Theory as Welfarist and Objectivist46

2.2 The Refutation of Conceptual Subjectivism48

2.3 The Simple Desire-Fulfillment Theory as the Best Version of Strong Subjectivism50

Against the Simple View: That Desires Can Be Based on False Beliefs53

Against the Simple View: That Desires Can Be Absent due to a Lack of True Beliefs62

Against the Simple View: That Second-Order Desires Must Be Taken into Account64

Against the Simple View: That It Is Unable to Capture the Critical Character of the Good67

2.4 The Refutation of Strong Subjectivism71

How Desires Entail Reasons72

A Question Left Open76

2.5 The Refutation of Weak Subjectivism76

The Subject-Relativity of Well-Being76

Internalist Constraints80

Troubles with Substantive Theories of Rationality90

A Question Left Open92

2.6 ‘Objective List’ Theories94

3 The Reasons That Make Action Intelligible96

3.1 The List of Goods96

3.2 Pleasure and Pain96

3.3 The Basic Goods100

Life101

Knowledge106

Aesthetic Experience109

Excellence in Play and Work111

Excellence in Agency114

Inner Peace118

Friendship and Community126

Religion131

Happiness133

3.4 Inner Peace, Happiness, and the Hybrid View of the Nature of Well-Being135

3.5 The Real Identity Thesis Revisited137

4 Welfarism and Its Discontents139

4.1 Welfarism in the Theory of Practical Rationality139

4.2 Welfarism Does Not Imply Egoism140

4.3 Welfarism Does Not Imply a Maximizing Theory of Rationality142

4.4 Welfarism Does Not Imply Promotionism147

5 The Principles That Make Choice Reasonable157

5.1 A Justificatory Framework for Principles of Practical Reasonableness157

Plans of Action and Principles of Practical Reasonableness157

The Formulation and Defense of Principles of Practical Reasonableness160

5.2 Egoism, Consequentialism, Kantianism162

Egoism162

Consequentialism167

Kantianism169

5.3 The Nature of Reasons for Action172

Welfarism about the Good172

Agent-Relativity and Agent-Neutrality174

Incommensurability182

Producible Ends and Ends-in-Themselves187

5.4 A Note on Hierarchy among the Basic Goods190

5.5 Principles of Practical Reasonableness Governing Plans of Action198

Against Dismissing or Devaluing Aspects of Well-Being198

Against Dismissing or Devaluing Persons within the Context of Agent-Neutral Ends201

Against Intentional, Instrumental Destruction of Instances of Basic Good204

Against Inefficiency207

5.6 Principles of Practical Reasonableness Governing Agents208

Against Over- and Under-Specificity in Planning209

Against Flightiness and Stubbornness210

Against Idleness212

5.7 Virtue Theory212

Virtue and the Correctness of Practical Judgment213

Virtues, Principles, and Motivation217

6 What Ought to Be Done220

6.1 ‘Ought’220

6.2 The Moral ‘Ought’222

6.3 How Practical Reason Can Err228

Against Discrimination230

Against Lying234

Against Callousness238

6.4 Moral Dilemmas240

6.5 Positive Norms, Life Plans, and the Partial Constitution Thesis246

6.6 Normative Openness and Natural Law Theories of Authority252

Notes255

Works Cited271

Index279

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